首先通过构建接受产业转移的“古诺模型”和采取地方保护的垄断模型，定量分析了地方保护对产业转移的影响，并通过对一个包含社会福利、晋升机制的官员效用函数的分析，解释了不同类型的地方官员广泛采取地方保护的深刻原因；其次，引入同发展阶段地区之间在接受产业转移时存在相互竞争这一因素，如果产业转移后各企业单位产品成本仍保持不变，地区竞争并不会加速产业转移。但是如果此时存在Arrow“干中学”效应，地区竞争是会加强产业转移，并同时实现官员晋升和本地社会福利的提高，可谓“一石三鸟”；最后，本文综合考虑了在产业转移过程中，地方保护和地区竞争这两个因素对转移地的社会福利的影响，发现凡是地区竞争能加速产业转移时，都会对当地的绝对和相对福利产生积极影响。

This dissertation first conducts quantitative analyses of the impact of regional protectionism on industrial transfer, under the Cournot and monopoly model respectively. It goes on exploring the occurrence of regional protectionism through a governor’s objective utility function that combines social welfare and political promotion. Furthermore, the passage takes regional competition into consideration and makes out its effects on industrial transfer. By allowing the marginal cost of the products of the region that successfully introduces industrial transfer to fall, or Arrow’s famous learning by doing theory, we can see an increase in both the possibilities of industrial transfer and political promotion as well as local social welfare. At last, the changes of local welfare are fully analyzed. We find that wherever regional competition fosters industrial transfer, it also improves the absolute and relative social welfare of that region.

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