论文利用现代信息经济学,对一类逆向选择条件下的企业间专利组合的收益分成策略,进行了规范性分析。论文的主要结论有：当存在好与差等两种类型的潜在参与者时,从专利组合策略的双方收益最大化的角度,专利组合策略领导者应该制定差异化的分成比率,而且也总可以找到有效的差异化的分成比率；一般来说,分成比率的制定符合成本定价原则或边际成本定价原则,而且在好的类型参与者投入和差的类型参与者一样大小的专利组合行为的努力程度时,好的类型专利组合参与者的收益分成比率要大于差的参与者的收益分成比率,反之,也然。最后,论文结合中国的实际,给出了一些规范性的对策和建议。

: Based on modern information economics, this paper analysis the revenue-sharing strategy of inter-firm patent portfolio within a kind of adverse selection. The main conclusion of this paper includes: the leader of inter-firm patent portfolio must always both find and make a effective separate revenue-sharing ratio for different participator when there are two different of patent portfolio participator, which are both good-type participator and bad-type participator. At the same time, not only the above revenue-sharing ratio should be made by the cost-pricing rule or marginal cost-pricing, but also the ratio for the good-type participator is more than that for the bad-type participator when the degree of endeavor degree of the good-type participator is same as that of the bad-type participator, vice versa.In the end, it presents some canonical countermeasures and suggestions according to the reality of China.

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委托代理框架下的专利组合策略及最优契约研究（70973057）;国家杰出青年科学基金