目前科技型小微企业的发展受到越来越多的制约。在此背景下,强调技术合作,促进小微企业协同创新是实现可持续发展的必然选择。因而将协同创新的研究视角扩展到小微企业领域,从利益主体角度出发,研究科技型小微企业对协同创新的行为选择必然具有重大意义。为此,本文首先运用静态博弈模型分析科技型小微企业采取“合作”和“背叛”策略的条件和动力机制,其次运用演化博弈模型阐释在重复博弈下小微企业选择的最优策略,在此基础上根据实际数据对理论模型构建的前提条件进行检验,最终提出有效促进科技型小微企业协同创新的政策建议。本文的研究有助于从微观角度理解转型升级背景下企业创新的行为选择,对于政府发展协同创新工作具有借鉴意义。

Currently, the development of technology-based small and micro businesses is faced with more and more constrains. In this context, it is necessary to develop the Cooperation-dominated pattern of collaborative innovation and realize sustainable development. Thus, fromStheSperspectiveSof the theory of collaborative innovation, it is of great practical significance to study the conflicts amongStheSkeySstakeholdersSand their strategies. In this paper, we analyze the reasons why the small and micro businesses should choose the strategies of “cooperation” and “defection” by static game. And then, in repeated games, evolutionarySgame is presented to shed light on theSoptimalSstrategy selected by the technology-based small and micro businesses. Based on this analysis, the real data are applied to analyze and test the theoretical prerequisite. Finally, some useful advice and approaches for making the collaborative innovation effectively are proposed. These conclusions are helpful for understanding the behaviors of the players in the transformation and upgrading, and are significant for the government to develop the collaborative innovation.

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国家社科基金“小微企业横向战略联盟与创新绩效研究”（13CGL044）；国家软科学研究计划重大合作项目(2013GXS2D024)；“第六批”国家博士后基金特别资助项目:转型期集群特征对企业绩效的影响机制研究（2013T60527）；“江苏省江苏科技体制改革思想库（苏科政<2012>264号）”重点项目资助；江苏省社会科学基金（12EYD018）。