专利许可二次研发的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Secondary Development of Patent Licensing

摘要:

如何提高中国专利的转化率已成为专利工作的重点内容。本文运用以有限理性为基础的演化博弈论,从专利许可的二次研发角度构建了一个演化博弈模型,分析不对称环境条件下有限理性的专利权人与被许可者的专利许可行为决策,并探讨决定系统收敛方向的影响参数,研究得出二次研发的激励动机受到二次研发的成本、二次研发的额外收益、专利转化的成功率和收益分配比例的影响。最后结合我国实际提出了相应的道德风险规避建议,以及激励机制的政策建议。

Abstract:

To increase the patent conversion rate is a crucial problem for China nowadays. This paper applies for the evolutionary game theory on the point of secondary development after patent licensing. Through analyzing the behavior decisions of the patentee and the licensee under the environment of asymmetric information with bound rationality, this paper reveals four key factors which influence the system evolution and the stability of equilibrium. It also makes corresponding suggestions on the avoidance of moral hazard and the encouragement of secondary development combining the actual condition of China.