基于多跟随者Stackelberg博弈的企业创新行为研究

The Study on Enterprise Creative Behavior in Multiple-Leader Stackelberg Game

摘要:

本文研究了一个多领导者的斯坦伯格纳什古诺竞争模型，并考虑到领导者与跟随者有产品质量差距。本文得到了该模型的均衡解，并对其进行的数值展现。本文发现，领导者有提高产品质量的动机，跟随者会与领导者保持适当的质量差距，良性竞争市场中逐渐形成合理的产业梯度，提升社会福利。最后，提出了政府提高社会福利的途径、策略和建议。

Abstract:

In this paper we study a multiple-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot model, considering the distance of product quality between the leaders and the followers. We obtain the equilibrium solution of the model, and provide a spacial case in the numerical perspective. We have found that, leaders have the motive to promote product quality, while the followers will keep appropriate quality distance. It will gradually form reasonble industrial gradient and enhance social welfare in the healthy competitive market. Finally, we raise some idea and suggestion from the view of authority.