[关键词]
[摘要]
企业行为理论下企业创新导向分为问题导向型和资源导向型,即企业出于改善业绩为目的或者利用组织冗余资源进行研发投资活动,利用2009年~2012年中国制造业上市公司的数据,结合企业行为理论和委托代理理论,研究创新导向和管理层激励对研发投资的交互作用。同时检验了管理层激励与研发投资可能存在的非线性关系。研究结果表明,短期薪酬激励与创新导向对研发投资存在替代效应,而问题导向越明显,长期股权激励能够显著地促进企业研发投资。
[Key word]
[Abstract]
Based on the behavioral theory,innovation orientation is divided into resource-oriented innovation and problem-oriented innovation. In other words, firms make an R&D investment based on the objective of performance improving or slack utilization. In combination with behavioral theory and agency theory, we examine a sample of Chinese publicly-traded manufacturing firms over the period of 2009-2012 and argue the interaction effect between innovation orientation and managerial incentives on R&D investment. We also examine the possible nonlinear relationship between managerial incentives and R&D. We find that there is a substitution effect between executive short-term incentives and innovation orientation on R&D investment, and the stock ownership and the problem orientation have a significant positive effect on R&D investment.
[中图分类号]
F124
[基金项目]
教育部人文社会科学研究规划“基于多层嵌套随机前沿模型的中国工业企业研发效率研究”(11YJA630053)
