碳排放权交易中企业减排行为的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Abatement Behaviors of Firms Participating in Carbon Emission Trading

摘要:

针对碳排放权交易中有限理性企业的减排行为的策略选择问题,基于演化博弈理论和方法,建立了有限理性企业的减排行为的演化博弈模型,并进行了求解分析。结果表明：企业的减排行为的策略选择与其单位碳减排成本密切相关,当两企业的单位碳减排成本不断变化时,会出现多种演化稳定均衡。政府对进行自行减排的企业给予适当的补贴,会激励企业进行自行减排,减少二氧化碳的排放。

Abstract:

Aiming at the strategies’ choice of carbon abatement behaviors of bounded rational firms who participate in carbon emission trading, an evolutionary game with carbon abatement behavior of bounded rational firms was formulated on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The evolutionary stable strategy of this system was discussed. The results showed that the abatement strategies of two firms were related to their carbon abatement cost per unit. When the carbon abatement cost per unit of two firms changed, some evolutionary stable equilibrium was found. If the subsidies government provided for the firms who carried out the carbon abatement action were big enough, the firms would have the motive to carry out the carbon abatement action to reduce carbon emission.