R&D补贴作为政府激励企业进行自主创新的一项财政投入,学者对其激励效应有互补、替代及不显著相关的观点。本文建立一个博弈模型,力图揭示R&D补贴对企业创新活动决策的影响机制。研究发现补贴政策的实施效果受技术溢出水平、政策的歧视性及行业特征的多重影响,并非呈现单一的互补或替代性。最后,文章给出不同情况下提高政策实施针对性和准确性的方法和建议。

R&D subsidy is implemented as a policy of stimulation to the innovation of enterprise, but the literature about its effect doesn’t reach an agreement, some considers the subsidy to promote the innovation of enterprise while the other is opposite. This paper build a game model, trying to reveal how R&D subsidy effect an enterprise when it makes its decision on innovation activities. It indicates that the level of technology spillover, the discrimination of the subsidy policy and the characteristic of industry, have multiple effect on the effect of R&D subsidy, which neither promote nor restrain the innovation solely. Our analysis provide some references and suggestions, according to which the government can enhance the efficiency of R D subsidy.

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教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目《基于多层嵌套随机前沿模型的中国工业企业研发效率研究》，项目编号：11YJA630053