竞争模式下内外部承包商技术创新行为激励研究
DOI:
CSTR:
作者:
作者单位:

西南交通大学,西南交通大学,电子科技大学成都学院

作者简介:

通讯作者:

中图分类号:

F282;F931;F224

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目“项目知识情境提取与展现方法研究基于主题模型和知识地图的大数据视角”(71472158);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金“多方参与的大型复杂项目团队成员合作行为和工作激励研究”(13YJA630144)


Study on Incentive of internal and external contractors technological Innovation behaviors based on more players’ competition
Author:
Affiliation:

Fund Project:

  • 摘要
  • |
  • 图/表
  • |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献
  • |
  • 相似文献
  • |
  • 引证文献
  • |
  • 资源附件
  • |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    针对业主利用承包商之间竞争对其收益的影响,设置锦标赛和信用评价竞赛机制来激励承包商行为的问题,建立相应的委托代理模型,分析内、外部承包商能力相同和不相同时,两种竞赛机制对承包商行为决策和业主收益的影响。研究表明:能力不相同时,承包商的创新努力投入随亲缘利他偏好和信用评价奖惩程度的增大而增大,在其他参数一定时,仅当信用评价奖惩系数满足一定条件,锦标赛机制才对承包商的技术创新行为具有激励作用。能力相同时,随机干扰、技术溢出水平越小,信用评价奖惩程度、锦标激励约束奖金越大,承包商的创新努力投入越大,相较外部承包商,亲缘内部承包商的创新努力投入更高。存在最优锦标激励约束奖金,其与其他参数大小有关。

    Abstract:

    Considering the impact of competition between the contractors on their earnings, this paper establishes principal-agent model to analyze the problem that the owner sets up the tournament and the credit evaluation competition mechanism to motivate the cooperative innovation behavior of the contractors. It analyzes how the competition mechanisms effect on the contractors’ behavioral decision and owner’s revenue, when internal and external contractors have the same ability or not. It found that, under the different ability condition, the innovation effort investment of the contractors increases with the increasing of kin altruism preference and reward or punishment degree of credit evaluation. When the other parameters are invariant, and the reward or punishment coefficient of credit evaluation satisfies some conditions, tournament mechanism can motivate the technological innovation behavior of the contractors. Under the same ability condition, the smaller the random disturbance and the technology spillovers, the greater the reward or punishment degree of credit evaluation and the incentive or constraint bonus of tournament, the greater the innovation effort investment of the contractors. Compared with external contractors, kin internal contractors put into higher innovation effort. There is the optimal incentive or constraint bonus of tournament, which is related to the size of other parameters.

    参考文献
    相似文献
    引证文献
引用本文

彭新艳,周国华,黄桂元.竞争模式下内外部承包商技术创新行为激励研究[J].,2017,(19).

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:
  • 下载次数:
  • HTML阅读次数:
  • 引用次数:
历史
  • 收稿日期:2016-12-05
  • 最后修改日期:2017-09-10
  • 录用日期:2017-02-08
  • 在线发布日期: 2017-10-17
  • 出版日期:
文章二维码

联系电话:020-37635126(一、三、五)/83568469(二、四)(查稿)、37674300/82648174(编校)、37635521/82640284(财务)、83549092(传真)

联系地址:广东省广州市先烈中路100号大院60栋3楼302室(510070) 广东省广州市越秀区东风西路207-213星河亚洲金融中心A座8楼(510033)

邮箱:kjgl83568469@126.com kjgl@chinajournal.net.cn

科技管理研究 ® 2025 版权所有
技术支持:北京勤云科技发展有限公司
关闭
关闭