风险规避下师徒间隐性知识共享激励机制

Incentive mechanism of tacit knowledge sharing between mentors and apprentices under risk aversion

摘要:

针对师徒间知识共享激励机制设计问题，考虑师徒风险规避这一特性，建立了多任务委托代理模型，分析了师徒风险规避度对组织激励合同系数、师徒双方努力程度以及组织收益情况的影响。研究表明，组织对师徒各自的最优激励系数与各自的风险规避度负相关，而不受对方风险规避度的影响，但组织收益却与师徒双方风险规避度负相关。虽然师傅自身工作的努力与知识共享帮助徒弟的努力仅与自身风险规避度负相关，但徒弟的工作努力却与双方的风险规避度负相关。进一步深入比较师傅在完成自身工作和知识共享帮助徒弟两种努力的大小表明，当师徒产出系数比大于上阀值时，师傅会更加关注自身工作，当产出系数比小于下阀值时，师傅会更加关注对徒弟的知识共享帮助，而当产出系数比位于上下阀值之间时，只有师傅的风险规避度小于一定程度，其才会花费更多的努力去知识共享帮助徒弟。

Abstract:

Aiming at the design problem of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism between mentors and apprentices, a multi-task the principal-agent model is established under the consideration of risk aversion between mentors and apprentices. The model analyzes the influences of the risk aversion of both mentors and apprentices on the incentive contract coefficient of the organization and the efforts that both parties made, and the income of the organization. The research shows that the optimal incentive coefficient of the organization to the master-apprentice is negatively correlated with their respective risk aversion -without the influences of risk aversion of the other parties. The organizational income, however, is negatively correlated with the risk aversion of the two parties. The efforts of the master's own work and the effort of knowledge sharing with apprentices are only negatively related to the master’s risk aversion. The effort of apprentices' work, however, is negatively correlated with the risk aversion of both parties. The further in-depth comparison of the master's efforts in completing his own work and knowledge sharing with apprentices shows that when the ratio of the teacher-apprentice output coefficient is greater than the upper threshold, the master pays more attention to his own work; when the ratio is less than the lower threshold, the master pays more attention to the knowledge sharing with his apprentices; when the master-apprentice output coefficient is between the upper and lower thresholds, the master inclined to share knowledge with apprentices only if the master’s risk aversion is less than a certain degree.