随着我国研发创新政策的不断推进，企业越来越多增加研发投入，但是反映企业自主创新转化能力的研发资本化却没有随之改善。以A股市场2007－2018年上市公司数据为样本，从管理防御视角出发，研究经理人对企业研发创新投资的影响，以及股权激励能否发挥对经理人管理防御和研发投资决策之间的治理作用。结果显示：经理人管理防御显著正向影响研发投入却显著负向影响研发资本化，即经理人的研发创新投资决策具有一定的创新迎合倾向；股权激励负向调节经理人管理防御与企业研发创新投资之间的关系，证实股权激励对经理人进行企业研发创新投资决策的治理效果。最后从政府研发创新政策制订、企业研发创新信息披露和采取有效的股权激励措施等方面提出优化企业研发投资决策建议。

With the continuous promotion of China's R&D innovation policy, more and more enterprises increase R&D investment, but the R&D capitalization expenditure reflecting the transformation ability of independent innovation has not improved. Based on the data of listed enterprises in China’s A-share market as sample from 2007 to 2018, this paper studies the impact of managers on R&D innovation investment of enterprises from the perspective of managerial entrenchment, and whether equity incentive can play a governance role in managers' R&D investment decisions. The results show that managerial entrenchment of managers has a significant positive impact on R&D investment, but a significant negative impact on R&D capitalization, which shows that managers' R&D investment decisions have a certain catering to the trend of innovation; in addition, equity incentive negatively moderates the positive relationship between managerial entrenchment and R&D investment, which confirms that the governance effect of equity incentive on managers' R&D innovation investment decision. Finally, the paper puts forward some suggestions on optimizing enterprise R&D investment decisions from the aspects of government R&D innovation policy formulation, enterprise R&D innovation information disclosure and effective equity incentive measure implement, and so on.

F275.5；F273；F224；G301

国家自然科学基金面上项目“我国创业板上市公司控制权配置、经理管理防御与成长性研究”（71772151）