基于演化博弈的区域大气污染联防联控生态补偿机制分析—以京津冀地区为例
CSTR:
作者单位:

北京工业大学

中图分类号:

F224

基金项目:

北京市自然科学基金项目《基于门限效应和合作博弈的京津冀大气污染联防联控机制研究》(9192002);北京市社会科学基金重点项目“京津冀大气环境联建联防联治的成本分担和生态补偿机制研究”(19YJA002)


Ecological Compensation mechanism of regional air pollution joint prevention and control based on evolutionary game theory: a case study of Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region
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    摘要:

    建立有效的生态补偿机制是协调区域大气污染联防联控各方主体利益的重要保障。依托演化博弈模型,通过分析影响区域联防联控策略的各利益参数的相互关系与作用,探讨了中央政府与区域地方政府两大博弈主体的策略选择与演化方向,并以京津冀地区为例进行仿真验证。继而运用系统动力学模型模拟了主要利益参数对博弈系统均衡结果的影响。结果表明,中央政府补偿政策的实施直接影响京津冀地方政府联防联控的执行决策,进而需要建立健全有效的生态补偿机制,通过有效分配补偿金额、减轻地方政府联防联控成本、提高监管效率以及加强地方政府执行政策不积极的惩罚力度等措施,促进区域地方政府采取大气污染联防联控策略以高效推进治理进程。

    Abstract:

    Abstract: The establishment of an effective ecological compensation mechanism is an important guarantee for coordinating the interests of all parties in the regional air pollution joint prevention and control. The evolutionary game model is used to analyze the interrelationships and effects of various benefit parameters that affect regional joint prevention and control strategies. The strategic choices and evolution directions of the two major game players, the central government and regional local governments, are discussed. The evolution of the game system is verified by simulation, taking the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region as an example. Then the system dynamics model is used to simulate the influence of the main benefit parameters on the equilibrium result of the game system. The results show that the implementation of the central government's compensation policy directly affects the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei local government's joint prevention and control decisions. Therefore, an effective and sound ecological compensation mechanism needs to be established by effectively allocating compensation amounts, reducing the cost of joint prevention and control of local governments, improving the efficiency of supervision, and strengthening the penalties of local governments for not actively implementing policies, etc. Effective ecological compensation policies encourage regional local governments to adopt air pollution joint prevention and control strategies, thereby effectively accelerate the governance process.

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李云燕,代建,盛清.基于演化博弈的区域大气污染联防联控生态补偿机制分析—以京津冀地区为例[J].,2022,(10).

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  • 收稿日期:2021-11-03
  • 最后修改日期:2022-05-25
  • 录用日期:2021-12-28
  • 在线发布日期: 2022-06-17
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