政府的科技资源配置策略将直接影响科研机构的基础研究行为，两方行为策略组合的本质特征是各基础研究参与方为实现自身利益最大化而进行的博弈互动。然而，鲜有研究关注到在基础研究发展过程中应如何协调政府与科研机构间的策略选择以实现各方利益最大化。因此，从博弈视角分析政府经费配置策略与科研机构基础研究行为之间的互动关系有其合理性与必要性。为此，综合考虑我国经费配置机制变革与经费总量提升对科研机构基础研究行为的影响，构建政府与科研机构行为互动的演化博弈模型，并对影响演化稳定策略的主要因素进行仿真模拟，结果表明：构建有效的稳定支持机制而非简单增加经费总量是科研机构聚焦主责主业的必要条件；政府不同干预手段对博弈主体的策略选择存在异质性影响，研发补贴的影响有限，其敏感性弱于预算扣减与科研奖励；政府初始意愿和科研机构间协同创新程度等因素也均会显著影响博弈系统演化收敛至理想状态的速度。由此启示我国政府应对科研机构实行与研究型大学差异化的经费资助模式，充分发挥惩罚性激励与国家科技奖等科研奖励对研究主体的激励作用，促进科研机构与大学之间的良性交互。

The government's strategy for allocating scientific and technological resources will directly affect the basic research behavior of research institutes. The essential feature of two-party behavioral strategies is the game interaction between basic research participants to maximize their own interests. However, few studies have focused on how to coordinate the strategic choices of government and research institutes in the development of basic research to maximize the interests of all parties. Therefore, it is reasonable and necessary to analyze the interaction between government funding allocation strategies and basic research behavior of research institutes from the perspective of game theory. To this end, comprehensively considering the impact of the reform of China's funding allocation mechanism and the increase in total funding on the basic research behavior of research institutes, an evolutionary game model for the interaction between government and research institutes is constructed, and the main factors that affect the evolutionary stability strategy are simulated. The results show that building an effective and stable support mechanism rather than simply increasing the total amount of funding is a necessary condition for research institutes to focus on the main responsibilities; different government interventions have heterogeneous effects on the strategy choices of game subjects, and the impact of R&D subsidies is limited with weaker sensitivity than budget deductions and research awards; factors such as the initial willingness of government and the degree of collaborative innovation among institutions also significantly affect the convergence speed of the game system to the ideal state. These enlighten our government to implement a differentiated funding model for research institutes and universities, give full play to the stimulating role of punitive incentives and research awards on research subjects, and promote benign interaction between research institutes and universities.

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