前景理论视角下海洋牧场企业技术协同创新演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Technology Collaborative Innovation in Marine Ranching Enterprises from the Perspective of Prospect Theory

摘要:

为研究前景理论视角下海洋牧场企业技术协同创新策略,本文基于前景理论视角,构建“政府-海洋牧场企业-学研方”的三方演化博弈模型,对系统的演化策略稳定性进行分析,并分析政府的监管成本与监管强度、中央政府惩罚、政府对企业以及学研方的激励与惩罚、协同创新的利益分配系数与成本分摊系数等因素对系统演化结果的影响,并通过Matlab软件进行数值仿真实验。结果表明,政府、海洋牧场企业以及学研方的决策行为受到其他两类参与主体的决策影响；中央政府的惩罚、以及地方政府的监管成本监管强度在一定范围内影响着政府自身行为的选择；政府对海洋牧场企业以及学研方的激励能够促进海洋牧场企业及学研方选择协同创新策略,但是政府的激励举措需要在政府可承受范围内；海洋牧场企业与学研方的策略选择受分摊系数的影响较大。

Abstract:

In order to study the technology collaborative innovation strategy of marine ranching enterprises from the perspective of prospect theory, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of "government - marine ranching enterprises - academic and research parties" based on the perspective of prospect theory, analyzes the stability of the evolutionary strategy of the system, and analyses the government"s regulatory cost and intensity, the central government"s punishment, and the government"s influence on enterprises and academic and research parties. The results show that the government, marine ranching enterprises and academic and research parties have the right to participate in the game. The results show that the decision making behaviour of the government, marine ranching enterprises and researchers is influenced by the decisions of the other two types of participants; the penalties imposed by the central government and the cost and intensity of regulation by local governments affect the choice of the government"s own behaviour to a certain extent; the incentives provided by the government to marine ranching enterprises and researchers can promote the choice of collaborative innovation strategies, but the government"s incentives need to be within the government"s affordability. However, government incentives need to be within the government"s affordability; the choice of strategies by marine ranching enterprises and academics is influenced by the apportionment factor.