在产品生产市场和排污权交易市场相关联的环境下,基于一个一般性的异质型寡头博弈模型对厂商的均衡产出和初始排污权的分配问题进行了研究。通过对模型的求解,给出了厂商的均衡产出的解析表达式,分析了厂商的均衡产出随排污权交易市场价格(以下简称排污权价格)的变化规律。结果表明：厂商的均衡总产出与排污权价格呈反向变化关系；当所有厂商的致污率系数相等时,各厂商的均衡产出以相同的幅度与排污权价格呈反向变化关系；当所有厂商的致污率系数不完全相等时,排污权价格对不同类型的厂商的均衡产出具有不同的调节功能,清洁程度或污染度越高的厂商的均衡产出对排污权价格变动的敏感度也越高。进一步,在前述结果的基础上,获得了厂商的初始排污权表达式,并基于拍卖机制分析了初始排污权的分配过程。最后,通过算例验证了模型结果的正确性。

Under the setting of the production market and the associated emission rights trading market, by applying a general heterogeneous oligopoly game model, this paper investigates the allocation problems of output and the initial emission rights for the manufacturers. By solving this model, this paper obtains the analytic formulas for the equilibrium output of the manufacturers and analyzes the change rule of the equilibrium output as the price of emission rights market (hereinafter referred to as the price of emission right) changes. The results indicate that: the total equilibrium output of the manufacturers has a negative correlation with the price of emission right; when all the manufacturers have the same causing pollution rate coefficient, the equilibrium output of each manufacturer has a negative correlation with the price of emission right at a uniform degree of variability; when the causing pollution rate coefficients of the manufacturers are not completely equal, the price of emission right has different regulatory effect on the equilibrium output of various types of manufacturers and the higher the degree of cleanliness or contamination of a manufacturer, the higher the sensitivity of its equilibrium output to changes of the price of emission rights. Furthermore, by the results mentioned above, the formulas for the initial emission rights of the manufacturers are obtained and the allocation process of the initial emission rights is analyzed based on auction mechanism. Finally, a numerical example shows that the results of the model are correct.

F276

教育部人文社会科学研究规划“流域水资源利用冲突及初始水权分配研究---基于博弈论视角(12YJAZH084)”；苏省高校“青蓝工程”项目（苏教师2014—23）；江苏省高校优秀中青年教师和校长境外研修项目（苏教师2012—13）