合作研发中的敲竹杠问题研究*

Research on the Property Right and Hold up in the Cooperation R

摘要:

本文分析一般情形和敲竹杠条件下产权分配对研发的投资激励影响。论文发现在一般模型中,不管产权由投资者、研究者或双方共同决定,都无法达到社会最优水平的投资和努力程度,而且研究者的努力程度取决于投资者的投资水平和研究者的产权比例；而在敲竹杠模型,不管初始产权如何分配,最后产权在两者之间的分配比例都是一样的,而且研究者的努力程度只与投资者的投资水平相关,与研究者最初的分配比例无关。

Abstract:

The paper analyzes a three-stage game on cooperation R D. It finds no matter who allocates the property right of the R D result by investor, or by researcher or by both, the investment and effort both can’t achieve the first best. The effort of research depends on the investment and the proportion of property right. The paper also builds a hold-up model. On the condition of renegotiation, we find no matter who decides the initial proportion, the last allocation of property right between the investor and researcher is the same. Further more, the research’s effort only depends on the investment, which is irrelevant of the initial property right"s proportion. As long as the investor and researcher of R D separate, neither investment nor effort can reach the first best.