产学研协同创新信任关系的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Trust Relationship in Industry-University-Research Collaborative Innovation

摘要:

针对产学研协同创新中信任行为的动态演变性,应用演化博弈理论构建了基于有限理性的协同创新信任关系演化博弈模型,深入协同创新信任关系。研究表明产学研协同创新信任关系包含多重均衡结果；博弈双方相互信任的概率与协同收益正相关,与创新资源投入、投机收益负相关,与吸收因子无关；存在着最佳的协同收益分配比例,使博弈双方相互信任的可能性最大化；政府加强对创新资源的激励机制可以有效提高产学研协同创新信任水平。

Abstract:

The trust behavior in Industry-University-Research collaborative innovation has properties of dynamic evolution. This paper applies the theory of evolutionary game to the study of trust relationship in IUR collaborative innovation and establishes the evolutionary game model for trust relationship based on the limited rationality of game participants. The research shows that the trust relationship in IUR collaborative innovation contains multiple equilibrium results. The probability of mutual trust between game participants is correlated positively with the synergistic benefits , and is correlated negatively with the innovation resource inputs and opportunity incomes. However, it has no relation with absorption factor. There is an optimal distribution ratio of synergistic benefits allocation to maximize the probability of each other trust of game participants. Furthermore, the motivation mechanism to innovation resource inputs can promote trust level in IUR collaborative innovation effectively.