基于演化博弈的企业生态技术创新行为研究

The Analysis of Enterprise Eco-technology Innovation Behavior based on Evolutionary Game

摘要:

借助演化经济学研究工具,将政府和企业同时纳入研究框架,构建出企业生态技术创新行为的博弈模型,并对策略选择进行演化动态稳定性分析,用数值仿真演示决策参数的不同取值和初始条件的改变对演化结果的影响及其演化路径。结果表明：政府监管成本、政府奖惩力度、企业创新收益等是影响企业生态技术创新行为动态演化的关键因素；生态技术创新收益较高时,无论政府是否选择监管策略,企业一定会选择生态技术创新策略；在对企业生态技术创新激励政策设计时,要兼顾经济绩效和环境绩效,实现双重帕累托改进,促使系统跳出不良“锁定”状态,朝着理想状态的方向演化。

Abstract:

We put both government and enterprise into the research framework and build a game model of enterprise eco-technology innovation behavior with the help of evolutionary economics research tools. Then, we analyze the evolution dynamic stability of strategy selection and use numerical simulation to demonstrate the impact of the change of decision parameter’s different values and initial conditions on the result of evolution as well as its evolutionary path. The result shows that the cost of government regulation, government’s strength on rewards and punishment, and the enterprise innovation revenue are the key factors which affect the enterprise eco-technology innovation behavior. When the profit of eco-technology innovation is high, whether the government chooses the regulatory strategy or not, the enterprise will choose the eco-technology innovation strategy. In the process of designing the incentive policy of eco-technology innovation, we should take into account both the economic performance and environmental performance to achieve the double Pareto improvement, so that the system can jump out of bad “locked” condition and evolves towards the ideal state.