供需网企业机会主义行为监管的演化分析

Evolutionary Analysis of Opportunistic Behavior and Supervisory in SDN

摘要:

针对供需网中因为合作竞争产生的机会主义行为，从微观角度建立演化博弈模型，研究企业机会主义行为与供需网监管行为之间互动演化的内部机理，并通过数值仿真分析其演进过程及影响因素。研究发现：供需网机会主义行为监管系统演化到二种稳定状态，一种是供需网以一定概率监管，同时企业坚持互惠主义的理想状态；另一种是供需网坚持监管，同时企业以一定概率选择机会主义行为的不良状态；系统的支付矩阵与初始状态影响监管系统的演化方向；过度监管降低供需网总体收益，且无助于机会主义行为的消除；适度监管条件下，供需网自身的合作机制可以有效遏制机会主义行为。

Abstract:

To study the opportunistic behavior caused by co-competition in Supply and Demand Network of Enterprise (SDN), an evolutionary game model was established to simulate the interactive mechanism of supervisory and opportunistic behavior between superintendent and node enterprises, from microscopic individual perspective. Numeric simulation and analysis show that two statues are the final evolutionary status, the one is SDN tend not to persistently supervise and enterprises stick to take reciprocity behavior, which is an ideal state. The other is SDN stick to supervise and the enterprises stick to take opportunistic behavior, which is a bad status; Final evolutionary status was decided by payoff matrix and initial ratio of strategies; Over-regulation rising total costs, reducing incomes, can’t eliminated opportunistic behavior in SDN; Moderate supervisory improved market regulation mechanisms to eliminated opportunistic behavior in SDN.