煤矿安全国家监察演化博弈的系统动力学分析

Study on the System Dynamics in the Evolutionary Game of Colliery Safety State Supervising

摘要:

煤矿安全监察是保障煤炭行业安全生产的重要手段和途径,既有文献关于煤矿安全国家监察传统博弈研究的假设大都与实际情况不符,对于在有限理性下的长期动态博弈过程缺乏相关研究。文章根据煤矿安全国家监察中各参与方的行为策略以及不同策略条件下的各方收益,运用演化博弈理论和系统动力学对其在有限理性下的长期动态博弈过程进行建模与动态性分析。研究结果表明：基于煤矿安全国家监察机构本位职能和煤矿企业本位利益界定的假设,国家监察机构与煤矿企业存在6种不同情形下的演化博弈行为和3个稳定均衡点,稳定均衡点与煤矿企业安全投资的费用、不安全投资被监察机构罚款以及期望事故损失和监察机构的监察成本、不认真执行监察职责而受到的罚款有密切关系。

Abstract:

s: Coal mine safety supervision is an important approach to secure the safety production of the coal industry. Most research to date hasSfocused onSstudying the coal mine safety supervision from the perspective of traditional game which is not consistent with the actual situation with the assumption of totally rational participants and mutual knowledge, and theSrelevant research lacks long-termSdynamic game processSunder bounded rationality. According to analyzing the behavioral strategy of game players and their income under the different strategies, the model of long-termSdynamic game process under bounded rationality was constructed and analyzed for studying the evolutionary stable state under the different circumstances by using the evolutionary game theory and system dynamics. The results show that there are six kinds of evolutionary gameSbehaviorsSunder different conditions and three stableSequilibrium points between the state supervisory administration and coal mines based on the assumption of standard functions and interests, and the stableSequilibrium points are not only related to the coal enterprise’s security input costs, fines for illegal production and expected casualtySand propertySloss, but also related to the state administration’s supervision costs and fines for derelictionSofSduty.