研发溢出效应下的闭环供应链专利授权经营策略

The strategy of patent authorization of closed-loop supply chain under RD spillover effect

摘要:

研究了一个OEM和一个IR组成的专利授权型闭环供应链，双方分别开展技术研发活动并存在溢出效应。建立并求解了三阶段闭环供应链独立研发和合作研发博弈模型，并用灵敏度分析和数值仿真对结果进行了分析。研究表明：双方研发投资额与再制造节约成本之间的关系取决于对方研发投资成本的大小；合作研发下的研发投资额高于独立研发模式，OEM和供应链整体利润始终高于独立研发，大多数情况下IR的利润低于独立研发模式。

关键词:合作研发投资;溢出效应;闭环供应链;Stackelberg博弈

Abstract:

This paper analyzes patent authorization strategy of closed-loop supply chain composed by one Original Equipment Manufacturer and one Independent Remanufacture who are developing technology RD activities of spillover effects. An independent and cooperative RD game model in three-stage closed-loop supply chain is established and solved and the result is studied by derivation method and sensitivity analysis. The study shows that the relationship between a member’s RD investment and remanufacturing saving cost depends on the investment cost of the other member. The RD investment and the profit of OEM and supply chain in cooperative mode is higher than that in independent mode while the profit of IR is lower than it in most cases.

Key words:cooperative RD investment; spillover effect; closed-loop supply chain;Stackelberg game