金字塔控股、产权异质与企业研发投入

Pyramidal Holding Structure, Difference of Property Rights and R&D Investment

摘要:

股权结构如何影响企业研发投入一直是理论界关注的重大问题。而传统的研究忽视了企业间控股结构对研发投入的影响。本文结合产权性质,全面地考察了金子塔控股特征对于企业研发投入的影响。实证表明当终极控制人为国家时,其研发投入少于终极控制人为非国家的企业；随着终极控制人控制权的加强,金字塔集团控制链的长度、公司的数量对上市公司研发投入产生的复杂效应不断减弱；两权分离度对研发投入具有负影响；当终极控制人为国家时,复杂效应与分离效应均不显著；当终极控制为其他主体时,复杂效应与分离效应却很显著。

Abstract:

The influence of ownership structure on corporate investment in R D has been a major problem in theory field. The traditional research ignores the effect of holding structure between different corporate on R D investment. In this paper, a comprehensive analysis of the effect of corporate pyramids structure on R D combined with difference of property rights is done. The empirical results show that, in the case of other conditions unchanged, state-controlled firms in China pay less R D investment than others; firms with longer control chain and more members pay less R D investment, but the increase of control rights will reduce the negative effect ; the separation of cash flow rights and control rights has a negative effect on R D investment; When the ultimate controller is the country, scale effect and the separation effect was not significant; when the ultimate controller are other body, scale effect and the separation effect is very significant.