集群供应链绿色合作行为演化博弈分析

Evolution Analysis on Cluster Supply Chain Green Cooperation and The Role Playing by Governments

摘要:

集群供应链绿色合作是解决产业集群工业污染和提高资源利用效率的一条重要途径。针对目前集群企业绿色合作动力不足问题,建立了集群供应链绿色合作行为与政府作用的演化博弈模型。在分析不同单链式供应链不同策略下各自的成本和收益基础上,运用演化博弈理论研究了集群供应链跨链绿色合作与政府管制行为之间的关系。结果显示：废弃物的产出规模、废弃物再利用固定投资、原材料的采购价格是集群供应链跨链绿色合作的先决条件；政府对废弃物排放而进行的罚款、政府的监管成本、政府监管失职招致的信誉损失对集群式供应链跨链绿色合作有不同程度的影响。最后根据研究结果,给出了相关政策建议。

Abstract:

Green cooperation of cluster supply chain is one of the important way to solve industrial pollution of industrial cluster and improve the efficiency of resource utilization. The main purpose of the research is to solve the problem of the limited motivation for cluster enterprise green cooperation. Based on the analysis of costs and benefits of cluster supply chain with different single supply chains and different strategies, this paper uses Evolutionary Game Theory to study the relation between on government environmental regulation behavior and crosswise green cooperation of cluster supply chain. The results manifest that the production scale of the wastes ,fixed investment of reusing and the material price were the key factors for the realization of cluster supply chain crosswise green cooperation; the government fine of By-product emissions of the core enterprise, the legal regulatory costs of the government and the neglect of government regulation duty incurred the credibility losses directly affect the game result. According to the results, it gives the relevant policy recommendations.