公平关切下闭环供应链的定价与协调研究

Pricing and coordinate in the Closed-loop Supply Chainwith Fairness Concerns

摘要:

为了研究公平关切和参照依赖行为对闭环供应链成员最优定价决策的影响,文章基于Stackelberg理论,采用数学建模方法分别研究分散式决策和批发价契约下的零售商公平关切、零售商和制造商皆公平关切两种情形。数值仿真研究表明：仅零售商公平关切时,批发价契约时的批发价低于分散式决策的情形,零售价高于分散式决策的情形,两种情况下的废旧品供给量不变。零售商和制造商皆公平关切时,随着零售商公平关切的增加,制造商的批发价降低。同时,随着制造商公平关切的增加,制造商的批发价提高。制造商的回收转移价格则相反。而且,制造商和零售商的过度公平关切也会导致闭环供应链系统的损失和社会环保程度的降低。

Abstract:

In order to study the closed-loop supply chain members’ fairness preferences and reference dependence how affect the optimal pricing decisions, based on the theory of Stackelberg game ,we explore the two case when only retailers have fair concerns, as well as manufacturers and retailers all having fairness concerns . Numerical simulation shows that when only retailers have fair concerns, the manufacturers’ wholesale price under the whole price contract is lower than the case when it is decentralized decision-making, and we have the opposite conclusion on the retail price. When manufacturers and retailers all have fairness concerns and reference dependence, the manufacturer"s wholesale price is a decreasing function of the retailer"s fairness concern and r?e?f?e?r?e?n?c?e ?p?r?e?f?e?r?e?n?c?e?, an increasing function of their fairness concern and r?e?f?e?r?e?n?c?e? ?p?r?e?f?e?r?e?n?c?e?, and we have the opposite conclusion on the manufacturer"s recycling transfer price. Further, when the competition between the retailers and manufactures is excessively high, it will lead to the low efficiency of the closed-loop and poor environmental conditions.