基于演化博弈的产学研合作创新稳定性分析

Cooperative Innovation stability analysis based on evolutionary game

摘要:

应用有限理性假设下的演化博弈研究方法，引入额外收益分配系数、违约金的惩罚数额等因素，构造产学研合作创新演化博弈模型，并进行了matlab数值仿真模拟，判断策略的进化稳定性，分析产方和学研方的策略选择行为。研究结果表明：演化结果具有鲜明的“路径依赖”特征，取决于系统的初始状态，并与合作方从合作获得的收益多少及收益能否得到公平的分配和违约金的惩罚数额密切相关。因此，确定合理的违约金惩罚数额，和分配系数的范围，才能保证产学研双方收敛于合作的稳定状态。

Abstract:

This paper studies the application of evolutionary game method under the assumption of bounded rationality, the introduction of additional income distribution coefficient, the amount of liquidated damages penalties and other factors, structural Cooperative Innovation evolutionary game model and numerical simulation matlab conducted to determine the evolutionary strategy stability analysis of the production side and the strategic choice behavior Gakken parties. The results show that: the result has a distinct evolutionary "path dependence" feature, depending on the initial state of the system and how much income and gains derived from cooperation with partners can get a fair amount of punishment is closely related to the allocation and liquidated damages. Therefore, to determine a reasonable amount of liquidated damages to punish, and the best allocation ratio, in order to ensure convergence to the steady state of both production and research cooperation.