政府与第三方治污的演化博弈研究

Study on the evolution game between the governments and the third party pollution treatment companies

摘要:

为研究政府与第三方治污之间交往的规则和制度形成的演化规律，借助演化经济学研究工具，建立政府和第三方治污的支付矩阵，分析政府和第三方治污企业交往过程的演化模型，展示了决策参数的不同取值对演化结果的影响。研究发现：政府与第三方治污的交互关系演化系统收敛于两种模式，随着双方成本和收益的改变，收敛于不同模式的概率发生显著变化；为寻求跳出不良“锁定”状态指明了方向，现阶段政府与第三方治污群体的交往模式自发演化依赖于各种策略的相对支付；政府应当制定严厉的排污惩罚制度和环保法规；第三方治污应当扩宽企业的盈利路径。

Abstract:

To find out the evolution law of the interactive process between the third party pollution treatment companies and governments, this paper, using the method of evolution economics, builds a payment matrix of the third party pollution treatment companies and governments, analyses the evolution model of the associations between the third party pollution treatment companies and governments, and shows the parametric diversity of decision-making and the effect of changing initial condition on evolution result by numerical simulation. The research reveals that the evolution system of the third party pollution treatment companies and governments converges on two types of patterns, the converging probabilities change notably with the changing of cost and benefit; the research directs the system how to jump out of the locked status, and points out that spontaneous evolution of association pattern between groups of the third party pollution treatment companies and governments is dependent on relative payment of various tactics; the government should enact strict environmental regulations; the third party pollution treatment companies should broaden their earnings path.