动态声明博弈下的知识流程外包质量激励

Quality Incentives for Knowledge Process Outsourcing Under Dynamic Cheap-talk Game

摘要:

知识流程外包近年来获得了巨大的发展,但其关于具体的运营问题却很少关注。通过强调知识结果的不易测量性,指出知识流程外包利用传统的外包契约,将导致较低的外包绩效。通过从长期动态结构中引入一个几乎不计成本的声明,试图解决不可契约部分质量低下的问题。结论指出,知识流程外包必须从长期战略出发,不仅需要更完善的正式契约,还需要加强与外包双方的互惠和信任关系,并且提升对知识结果质量的评估,考评和关注的能力建设,以实现知识流程外包的服务质量激励。

Abstract:

Knowledge Process Outsourcing has enjoyed great growth recently, but scarce attention in literatures is put into its operation. Due to the difficulty in measuring the knowledge performance, it is suggested that adoption of conventional outsourcing contracts in Knowledge Process Outsourcing leads to poor results. This paper attempts to solve the problem about poor service qualities under KPO context with introduction of almost zero-cost Cheap-talk into a long-term dynamic game-theoretical structure. The conclusions emphasize that, Knowledge Process Outsourcing need to be oriented in long-term strategy, which required not only more complete formal contract but also reinforced reciprocal and trustful relationship between both outsourcing parties. It also suggests that the significance in promotion of the dynamic capabilities about assessment, inspection and awareness of knowledge service quality.