政府干预、外部投资与企业自主创新——基于信号传递博弈模型

Government Intervention, External Investment and Business Independent Innovation—based on Signaling Games Model

摘要:

针对我国企业自主创新普遍面临着融资约束和研发投入不足的问题,笔者运用信号传递模型,对政府干预、外部投资与企业自主创新的主体行为进行研究。结果显示：致力于基础建设和创新开发的政府都会选择对辖区内企业实施高干预；企业接收到信号会选择实施创新开发活动,外部投资者会采取投资行为,其参与与否对最终均衡结构产生显著影响；最终的均衡与企业创新成功的概率、外部投资活动成功的概率及收益有关。

Abstract:

Independent innovation of enterprises in China is faced with financing constraints and the problem of insufficient R D investment, by utilizing signal transmission model, the government intervention, external investment, and the main body of enterprise independent innovation behavior were studied. The results showed that dedicated to the development of infrastructure and innovation, the government will choose to enterprises within their respective jurisdictions implement high intervention; Enterprises will choose to implement innovative development activities to reception, outside investors will take investment behavior, their participation or not have a significant impact on final balance structure; The ultimate equilibrium and the probability of successful enterprise innovation, the probability of successful external investment activities and benefits.