监督视角下公平偏好顾客创新团队的激励问题研究

A Research on Incentive Problem of Innovative Customer Team under Horizontal and Vertical Supervision Based on Equity Preference

摘要:

从顾客参与企业产品创新的角度出发，首先，分析、对比不存在横向监督和存在横向监督情况下的最优激励模型；其次，探讨企业项目管理者在已存在横向监督机制的前提下对顾客创新团队实施纵向监督时，纵向监督与已有的横向监督实现最优组合的时候的条件；第三，研究横向监督中的各要素(如同事压力敏感度、参与成本、团队协同系数和监督难度)对企业管理者实施纵向监督行为的影响作用；最后，通过算例验证研究结论,并提出管理启示。

Abstract:

First, the article analyzes and compares the optimal incentive models under horizontal supervision and under no horizontal supervision from the perspective of customer participates in the enterprise’s product innovation. Second, discusses and determines the best combination condition between vertical supervision and existing horizontal supervision when enterprise’s project manager implement vertical supervision to innovative customer team under the premise of existing horizontal supervision. Third, studies the impact of various elements of horizontal supervision (such as the peer pressure sensitivity, the cost of participation, the team coordination coefficient and the difficulty of supervision) on the managers’ behaviors of vertical supervision. Finally, data from a real-world enhancement project are used to validate the proposed research conclusions, and then puts forward corresponding management advices.