企业技术创新行为的演化博弈及对种业创新困境的解释

Evolutionary gaming of companies

摘要:

鉴于我国种业发展存在创新水平低、“套牌”和假冒伪劣产品充斥市场等问题,本文利用演化博弈理论的方法,对我国种业创新企业的创新行为进行了演化博弈分析,并对我国种业创新困境进行了解释,主要结论如下：知识产权保护制度不完善导致“柠檬市场”；种业市场虚假繁荣下面临技术扩散约束；低市场集中度约束了模仿企业创新投入和市场定价能力；消费者偏好保守不利于种业企业创新的增加；企业的短见对种业创新产生约束。

Abstract:

As China"s seed industry is under low level innovation, and counterfeit products is prevailing, this paper analyzed the firms" innovation behaviors and used Evolutionary Game Theory to predict the factors influencing companies ‘group innovation behavior, with which trying to explain the innovation dilemma. The conclusions are as follow: firstly, imperfect intellectual property protection system lead to "Lemon Market"; secondly, technology diffusion is constrained under false prosperity market; thirdly, low market concentration constrained the imitative innovation companies" R D investment and pricing ability; fourthly, consumers" risk avoidance preference negatively influences the companies" innovation; finally, shortsighted companies constrained the industry innovation.