质量信息揭示、逆向选择与食品安全

Quality signaling, adverse selection and food safety

摘要:

食品质量信息揭示是缓解食品市场中的“逆向选择”行为,提高食品安全水平的重要方式。基于食品的经验品和信任品特性,分析了食品厂商如何通过自愿性信息揭示缓解食品市场中的逆向选择问题,以及政府如何通过强制性信息揭示保障食品安全。研究结果表明,对于自愿性信息揭示来说,信息揭示成本对于能否实现高质量厂商与低质量厂商的分离均衡至关重要,信息揭示在能为高质量厂商带来溢价收益的同时,应使低质量厂商出于成本考虑不敢进行虚假信息揭示；对于强制性信息揭示来说,信息揭示成本应促使厂商丧失生产不安全食品的动机,保障食品安全。

Abstract:

quality signaling of food is a very important way for easing the phenomenon of adverse selection and improving the level of food safety. Base on the attribute of experience good and credence goods, this research separately analyze how food manufacturers easing the problem of adverse selection in food market through voluntary quality signaling, and how government ensuring food safety through mandatory quality signaling. The results indicate that cost of quality signaling is crucial for the realizing of separating equilibrium between high-quality manufacturers and low-quality manufacturers for voluntary quality signaling, high-quality manufacturers should get premium income from quality signaling, and low-quality manufacturers can’t implement false quality signaling due to huge cost. For mandatory quality signaling, to ensure food safety, the cost of quality signaling should make food manufacturers lose the motivation of producing unsafe food.