纵向产品差异化的序贯创新研究
CSTR:
作者:
作者单位:

上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

中图分类号:

F273.2

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(面上项目,重点项目,重大项目)


Sequential Innovation in the Vertical Product Differentiation
Fund Project:

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (General Program, Key Program, Major Research Plan)

  • 摘要
  • | |
  • 访问统计
  • |
  • 参考文献 [12]
  • |
  • 相似文献 [20]
  • | | |
  • 文章评论
    摘要:

    通过界定垄断阶段和双寡头竞争阶段,在市场未完全覆盖条件下,构建纵向差异化下产品创新企业序贯进入的博弈模型,分析产品的差异化对企业利润、博弈均衡和社会福利的影响。研究表明:产品差异化的不同区间分别对应四种不同的均衡;企业可预判与对手的产品差异化水平从而选择均衡利润;社会福利在可行区间上呈现不同的变化趋势,政府可根据最优的差异化水平制定相应的专利制度,实现社会福利最大化。

    Abstract:

    By defining the monopoly and duopoly, under not covered market,this paper built a game model of sequential innovation with vertical product differentiation and investigated the effects of the product differentiation on the firms’ profits, game equilibrium and social welfare. The results show that (i) four equilibrium exists in the different intervals of product differentiation respectively; (ii) firms can predict product difference so as to choose the equilibrium profit; (iii) since the social welfare varies in the feasible interval, the government can make patent system to maximize the social welfare according to the optimal level of difference.

    参考文献
    [1] SHAKED A, SUTTON J. Relaxing Price Competition through Product Differentiation[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1982, 49(1): 3-13
    [2] AOKI R, PRUSA T. Sequential versus Simultaneous Choice with Endogenous Quality[J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 1997, 15(1): 103-121
    [3] LEHMANM-GRUDE U. Strategic Choice of Quality when Quality is Costly: the Persistence of the High-quality Advantage[J]. RAND Journal of Economics, 1997, 28(2): 372-384
    [4] AOKI R. Effect of Credible Quality Investment with Bertrand and Cournot Competition[J]. Economic Theory, 2003, 21(2-3): 653-672
    [5] LAMBERTINI L, TAMPIERI A. Low-quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition[J]. Economics Letters, 2012, 115(3): 396-398
    [6] LAMBERTINI L, TEDESCHI P. Would You Like to Enter First with a Low-quality Good? [J]. Bulletin of Economic Research, 2007, 59(3): 269-282
    [7] DUTTA P K, LACH S RUSTICHINI A. Better Late than Early: Vertical Differentiation in the Adoption of a New Technology[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995, 4(4): 563-589
    [8] HOPPE H C, LEHMANM-GRUDE U. Second-mover Advantages in Dynamic Quality Competition[J]. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2001, 10(3): 419~433
    [9] TIROLE J. The Eheory of Industrial Organization[M]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988:96-97
    [10] MOTTA M. Endogenous Quality Choice: Price vs. Quantity Competition[J]. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1993, 41(2): 113-131
    [11] VAN DIJK T. Patent Height and Competition in Product Improvements. Journal of Industrial Economics, 1996, 44(2): 151-167.
    [12] LAMBERTINI L, TEDESCHI P. On the Social Desirability of Patents for Sequential Innovations in a Vertically Differentiated Market. Journal of Economics, 2007, 90(2): 193-214.作者简介:冯磊东(1984—),男,河南南阳人,博士研究生,主要研究方向产品创新管理。顾孟迪(1962—),男,江苏常州人,教授,博士生导师,主要研究方向为技术创新、风险管理。
    引证文献
    网友评论
    网友评论
    分享到微博
    发 布
引用本文

冯磊东,顾孟迪.纵向产品差异化的序贯创新研究[J].,2016,(3).

复制
分享
文章指标
  • 点击次数:418
  • 下载次数: 61
  • HTML阅读次数: 0
  • 引用次数: 0
历史
  • 收稿日期:2014-11-20
  • 最后修改日期:2014-11-20
  • 录用日期:2015-03-19
  • 在线发布日期: 2016-02-29
文章二维码

联系电话:020-37635126(一、三、五)/83568469(二、四)(查稿)、37674300/82648174(编校)、37635521/82640284(财务)、83549092(传真)

联系地址:广东省广州市先烈中路100号大院60栋3楼302室(510070) 广东省广州市越秀区东风西路207-213星河亚洲金融中心A座8楼(510033)

邮箱:kjgl83568469@126.com kjgl@chinajournal.net.cn

科技管理研究 ® 2025 版权所有
技术支持:北京勤云科技发展有限公司
请使用 Firefox、Chrome、IE10、IE11、360极速模式、搜狗极速模式、QQ极速模式等浏览器,其他浏览器不建议使用!
关闭
关闭