产品异质、R D激励与环境规制工具选择

Product Heterogeneity, R&D Incentive and the Choice of Environmental Regulation Instrument

摘要:

技术进步是解决环境问题的根本出路，比较不同的治理方式下环境R&D投资的激励是政策工具选择的关键。建立双寡头Bertrand序贯博弈模型，比较均衡时四种环境规制手段的厂商R&D激励大小。研究认为，排污税和拍卖R&D激励最高，在异质产品市场上，使用简单排放标准比排污权交易更能激励企业从事环境研发投资，获得动态效率提升。在环境治理方式选择上，切忌政策“一刀切”，要充分考虑市场结构、规制目标和需求函数等诸多因素影响。

Abstract:

Technical Progress is perhaps the mail vehicle to solve environmental problem in the long run. This paper builds Bertrand sequential game model and compares R&D incentives of four environmental regulation instruments based on heterogeneity product. The basic conclusion is auctioned permits and emission taxes offers the highest R&D incentive among four regulation instruments, command-and-control instrument have more dynamic efficiency than tradable permits under heterogeneity product market. Policy makers should avoid “one size fits all” when choosing environmental regulation instrument and consider fully the influence of market structure, regulation goal and demand function.