研发外包中,服务商参与技术成果转化能提高新产品的开发速度和成功率。针对技术成果转化中的服务商道德风险与激励问题,在奖励激励的基础上进一步引入监督激励。首先,构建奖励与监督下的动态博弈模型,分析了奖励与监督激励的可行空间。随后,研究了监督成本对客户激励选择的影响,研究表明,当监督成本小于某一临界值时,客户引入监督激励时的收益更高,反之则奖励激励更有效,且临界监督成本与服务商努力成本、服务商“偷懒”下技术成果转化成功的概率正相关。最后,通过算例对研究结论进行了演示说明。

If customer invites service provider to participate in the technical achievements transformation of R D outsourcing, the speed and success rate of new product development will be improved. For the moral hazard problem and incentive problem of service provider during technical achievements transformation, monitor is introduced into the traditional reward incentive. At first, a dynamic game model under reward and monitor incentive is built. It analyzes the feasibility of reward and monitor incentive. And then, this paper researches the influence of monitor cost on the choice of incentive method for customer. It shows, when monitor cost is less than one critical value, customer chooses monitor incentive can acquire higher profit, whereas reward incentive is more effective. Besides, the critical value is positively correlated with the effort cost of service provider and the success probability of technical achievement transformation under the condition that service provider chooses to be lazy. Finally, these research conclusions are illustrated by one example.

国家自然科学基金项目“知识密集型服务外包中的知识共享激励与知识资产争端协调机制研究”（71301182）；重庆市科委决策咨询与管理创新计划项目“重庆市汽车产业可持续发展动力机制与对策研究”(cstc2014jccxB60001)