专利池还是纵向合并？

Patent Pool or Vertical Integration?

摘要:

多研究工具投入型累积创新往往会引发“反公共资源悲剧”,该问题通常通过“专利池”或者“纵向合并”的方法解决。本文通过一个垂直结构市场模型对这两种解决方法的内在形成机理进行分析,结果表明,如果上游市场不存潜在进入者,专利池和纵向合并都难以形成,导致“反公共资源”问题出现；如果上游市场存潜在进入者,不但能够促使专利池的形成,还有可能实现整个市场的纵向一体化。

Abstract:

Cumulative innovation of multi-research tool input often trigger “anticommons”. These problems are solved by “patent pool” or “vertical merger” usually. This paper studies the inner formation mechanism of the two solutions by a model of vertical structure market. The results show that both vertical merger and patent pool are difficult to be formed if without potential entrant in the upstream market. If there are potential entrants in the upstream market, it not only prompts patent pool formation but also realizes vertical integration of whole market.