基于动态演化的高校专利商业化合作博弈研究

The Game Research on Universities Patent Commercial Cooperation Based on Dynamic Evolution

摘要:

专利商业化合作是实现专利商业价值与市场应用相匹配的有效手段。文章将企业和高校专利商业化合作过程中的策略划分为合作策略和不合作策略,引入演化博弈理论分析方法,基于演化博弈思想构建企业与高校间专利商业化合作的演化博弈模型,基于动态的观点考察两个群体在专利商业化合作过程中的策略选择和演化路径问题；在此基础上,探索影响企业和高校专利商业化合作的关键因素。研究表明：企业和高校专利商业化合作过程中的策略演化稳定于合作、不合作或者合作与不合作混合的均衡状态,至于最终稳定于何种状态,取决于该模型的支付矩阵；并且该系统合作策略的演化与模型初始参数设置,如合作获得的额外收益、违约金、合作风险损失、初始成本以及合作收益的贴现因子等因素密切相关,初始参数变化将导致系统收敛于不同的均衡点。

Abstract:

Patent commercial cooperation is the effective means to realize the patent business value match the market application. In order to discuss the problem of choice of strategy of enterprises and universities patent commercial cooperation and evolution path under dynamic views, the paper divided strategy of enterprises and universities patent commercial cooperation into cooperative strategy and non-cooperative strategy and established an evolutionary game model of enterprises and universities patent commercial cooperation based on the theory of evolutionary game. On the basis of this, to explore the key factors affecting enterprises and universities patent commercial cooperation. The results show that the strategy evolution of enterprises and universities patent commercial cooperation stability in cooperative strategy, non-cooperative strategy or both of them, and the direction of evolution path is closely related to player’s payoff and influenced by model’s initial status, such as excess returns, revenue of breaking the contact, loss caused by risk, initial cost and bilateral discount factors of cooperation revenue, and the system converges to different equilibrium as initial parameters change.