激励视角下PPP项目补贴方式研究

Incentive mechanism of construction subsidy and operation subsidy in public-private partnerships

摘要:

文章从激励理论的视角分析了PPP项目中“补建设”和“补运营”这两种补贴方式背后的激励效果,同时进一步将“补运营”分为基于收益的补贴、基于成本的补贴和基于利润的补贴三种补贴模式,研究了不同补贴模式下私人部门的最优努力行为以及政府的最优激励系数,并通过对比分析得出政府部门的最佳激励模式。

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the main incentive issues of construction subsidy and operation subsidy in public-private partnerships (PPP) based on principal-agent theory. By dividing the operation subsidy into subsidies based on revenues, subsidies based on costs and subsidies based on profits, we discussed the contractor’s best effort and the government’s best incentive behavior under different subsidy model, and obtaining the best subsidy measures of government.