基于离散动力系统的创新策略选择演化博弈—以科技型中小企业为例

An Evolutionary Game for Tech SMEs Innovation Strategy Selection Based on the Discrete Dynamical System Theory

摘要:

创新策略选择是科技型中小企业创新战略的重要组成部分。在创新资本预算有限的约束下,基于离散动力系统理论,运用演化博弈研究了研发创新、非研发创新活动与企业创新资本结构的演化,并对模型进行了数值模拟和演化稳定性分析。研究结果表明：在满足一定的前提条件下,企业的创新策略选择将演化稳定于两种策略共存状态；创新成本、研发创新门槛、创新风险及政府扶持力度对于企业的创新策略选择及创新资本结构的演化起到关键作用。

Abstract:

Innovation strategy selection is an important part of small and medium-sized technology-based enterprises" innovation strategy. This article analysis the evolution of R&D innovation activities, non-R&D innovation activities and innovation capital structure by using the evolutionary game theory under the premise of limited innovation capital budget .And do the numerical simulation and stability analysis for the model .The results showed that: In certain preconditions, the innovation strategies will be evolutionary stable in the coexistence of two strategies; Innovation costs, the threshold of R&D innovation activities, innovation risks and government's support for the companies' innovation play a key role in the evolution of strategy selection and innovation capital investment.