在考虑融资成本不对称的情况下，将期权博弈理论的不确定性、不可逆性、竞争性和信息不对称性等因素同时纳入研究框架，构建一个基于不对等市场竞争优势的投资决策模型。通过仿真实验，发现领先者有竞争优势能激励其更早进入，反之追随者有竞争优势则可避免其他企业抢先进入的威胁；此外，企业跟随者临界值较企业领先者的临界值对融资成本的变化更敏感，企业降低融资成本可获得相对较高的收益。最后，结合企业的经营成本、建设时间、政府补贴对企业竞争的影响，给出模型对中小微企业构筑竞争优势、缓解融资成本压力，实现跨越式发展的理论解释。

Considering the asymmetric financing costs, the articlebrings the options game theory of uncertainty, irreversibility and competition and information asymmetry into study, and form an asymmetrical duopoly investment decision-making model based on the difference between the market competitive advantages. Through the simulation experiments, we find that a competitive advantage can inspire the leader to start investing earlier, whereas followers have a competitive advantage can avoid the threat of other companies to beat into the market. In addition, to the changes of the financing costs, the critical value of the enterprise follower is more sensitive than the leader’s. Enterprises reduce the financing costs can obtain relatively high income. Finally, combined with the management cost, construction time, and government subsidies impact on the enterprise competition, the article concludes the theoretical explanation about the UMKM building competitive advantage, alleviating the pressure of financing costs and achieving leapfrog development.

基金项目：国家软科学研究计划“中小微企业出口供应链金融服务模式创新与激励政策设计”（2014GXS4B069）