水利基础设施PPP项目剩余控制权优化配置模型

Optimal Allocation Model of Residual Control Rights in Public-Private Partnerships for Water Infrastructure

摘要:

PPP模式下,公私双方控制权的合理配置与合作效率密切相关。本文针对PPP合作过程中公共部门和私人部门的能力差异性和目标差异性以及水利基础设施不确定性大的特点,结合不完全契约理论,建立激励约束视角下PPP项目剩余控制权的优化配置模型。基于该模型,分析了私人部门的投资额度、股权比例、技术水平、管理能力,公共部门的协调、监管、社会收益期望值等因素与剩余控制权配置比例的关系,进而提出一系列基于剩余控制权优化配置的激励约束方案。本文的研究成果不仅为PPP模式下公私双方的剩余控制权优化配置提供理论和应用依据,而且完善和补充了PPP模式契约机制设计理论。

Abstract:

The rational allocation of control rights between public and private sectors is closely related to efficiency of PPP. According to the productivity differences, the goal difference of the public and private sectors and the uncertainty of water project under the PPP, combining with the incomplete contract theory , this paper established optimal allocation model of residual control rights from the perspective of incentive and constraint. By solving and analyzing this model, the relationship between the investment, equity ratio, technical level, manage ability, monitoring costs, social benefits and allocation of residual control rights was derived, and then a series of incentive schemes based on these results were proposed. This research not only provide theory and application basis on optimization allocation of residual control rights in PPP , but also improve and complement the contract mechanism design theory of PPP .