通过建立演化博弈模型分析了集群内企业展示或隐藏创新行为演化的过程特征和均衡状态。当产业集群内的知识溢出效应增大时,系统收敛于(展示创新,展示创新)状态的概率增大,即产业集群的企业均坚持展示创新行为,产业集群朝着良性的状态发展。当产业集群内的模仿行为给创新企业带来的损失增大时,系统收敛于(隐藏创新,隐藏创新)状态的概率增大,不利于产业集群内的知识溢出,最终使产业集群走向衰退。针对促进产业集群内企业选择展示创新行为的路径,提出了相应的建议。

The paper analyzed the process characteristics and equilibrium state of the evolution of exhibiting or hiding innovation behavior of the enterprises in the industrial cluster by establishing evolutionary game model. When the knowledge spillover effect in industrial cluster increases, the probability that system converges to the state of “exhibiting innovation,exhibiting innovation” increases. That is, the enterprises in the industrial cluster are all insisting on exhibiting innovation behavior, and the industry cluster is developing towards a healthy state. When the imitation behavior in industrial clusters make the loss of the innovation enterprise increases, the probability that system converges to the state of “hiding innovation,hiding innovation” increases. And it is not conducive to the knowledge spillovers in the industrial clusters, finally causes the industrial clusters to decline. The paper put forward the corresponding suggestions in view of the path to promote the enterprise to choose to exhibit innovation in the industry cluster.

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中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目“新企业产业集群嵌入创业融资研究”(2015ZX23)；