双边道德风险与风险投资契约中的最优控制权配置

Double moral hazard and the optimal allocation of control rights in VC contract

摘要:

风险投资中,信息不对称和契约的不完全性会引起双边道德风险。在风险投资家VC和创业企业家EN的谈判过程中,控制权配置类型决定了事后套牢的可能性和再谈判收益,进而影响双方事前努力水平。因此,控制权的配置会带来新的双边道德风险。文章通过构建控制权动态配置模型,采用数值分析,寻求能使VC和EN达到次优努力水平的控制权配置类型及其激励机制。结论显示,通常情况下以企业业绩为信号的相机控制是最优的,当且仅当VC和EN之间谈判力悬殊时由谈判力弱的一方控制是最优的。研究结论验证了风险投资中广泛采用相机控制的合理性。

Abstract:

Information asymmetry and the incompleteness of the contract can cause double moral hazard in venture capital financing. In the negotiation process of VC (venture capitalists) and EN (venture entrepreneurs), different allocations of control rights determine the possibility of ex post hold-up and the renegotiation income, and then affects the their ex ante effort. Therefore, the control rights allocation will bring new double moral hazard. In order to find the allocation which let VC and EN make second-best efforts, as well as its incentive mechanism, the paper constructed a dynamic allocation model and used numerical method. The results show that, normally the contingent control allocation is optimal in which the corporate performance is a signal; if and only if a great disparity in bargaining power between VC and EN, the weak side controlling the corporation is optimal. This paper validated the rationality of the widespread use of contingent control in venture investment.