政府、电站与CCS的技术扩散——基于博弈分析的视角

Government，Power Plants and CCS Technology Diffusion—— A Perspective of Game Theory Model

摘要:

碳捕捉与储存（CCS）技术因其短期内减少CO2排放的显著性而成为应对气候变化的最有效措施之一。在分析CCS特征与利益相关者的基础上，指出我国政府与电站间CCS技术扩散存在的困境，由此构建了博弈模型，分析技术扩散过程中两个博弈方的收益。数值算例研究得出政府给予电站补贴后双方都受益，并且政府受益的程度更大。最后针对政府补贴、激励与奖惩提出了3条政策建议：（1）加强对政府补贴资金的监管；（2）继续推广CCS技术及示范项目；（3）加大CCS技术的基础性研究力度。

Abstract:

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology becomes one of the most effective measures to respond to the climate change for the significance of reducing emissions of cardon dioxide in the short term. Based on the analysis of characteristics and stakeholders of CCS, the paper points out difficulties of CCS technology diffusion between government and power plants in China, and builds a game model to analyze the revenue of both players during the process of technology diffusion. Followed by numerical examples to verify, concluding that both sides benefit with a greater degree of government after the subsidies of government. Finally, it offers recommendations for government subsidies and incentives.