管理者薪酬水平与企业研发投资 ——基于广东战略性新兴企业的研究

Executive Compensation and Corporate R&D Investment：Based on the Research of Guangdong Strategic Emerging Enterprises

摘要:

文章以广东战略性新兴企业为样本，通过手工收集数据，研究了管理者薪酬对企业研发创新的影响。研究发现高管货币薪酬激励对企业研发投资有显著正向促进作用，而高管持股却并非如此。文章认为这与高管持股整体偏低以及企业股权激励机制不健全有关。进一步研究发现，当企业绩效不佳时，高管薪酬对企业研发创新的影响并不显著，说明业绩欠佳企业更关心的是企业的生存而不是由研发创新推动的发展。文章最后指出了企业做大与做强之间的矛盾。

Abstract:

Based on the sample of Guangdong strategic emerging enterprises, the paper studied the relationship between managers’ compensation and R&D investment. The study found that the relationship between monetary compensation and R&D investment is significantly positive, but executives’ shareholding is negatively related to the enterprise R&D investment. The article analyzed the main reason, the executives’ shareholding is not a real performance-related equity incentive. Further studies found that, in the low performance sample group the relationship between managers' compensation and R&D investment is not significant, perhaps enterprises are more concerned about their survival, rather than development in poor performance. Finally, pointed out the contradiction between bigger and stronger for the enterprise.