入孵创业企业的道德风险长期制约着科技企业孵化器的融资行为。针对科技企业孵化器与互联网金融有机结合的新形势，构建科技企业孵化器、创业企业、风险投资三者间的演化博弈模型，并分析三方合作的稳定性。研究结果表明：借助互联网金融能够有效缓解信息不对称问题，提高融资成功率：当创业企业违约罚金期望值大于违约后的额外净收益时，创业企业必将选择诚信策略；而且降低科技企业孵化器努力成本、降低创业企业的融资目标和提高风险投资的投资预期收益有助于提高融资成功率。而当科技企业孵化器无法对创业企业进行有效监督时，创业企业必定选择投机——创业企业投机风险存在的必然性。

Moral hazard of start-ups long-term restricts high-tech business incubator financing. Based on the combination of high-tech business incubator and internet financial, it constructs evolutionary game model of entrepreneurial high-tech business incubators, start-ups and venture capital, and analysis of the cooperation stability. Research shows that, it can effectively reduce the information asymmetry by internet financial, promote start-ups financing successfully: When default fine expectations is greater than the default extra net earnings, start-ups will choose integrity strategy, and reducing the effort cost High-tech Business Incubator, reducing the financing goal of start-ups and improving the expected income of venture capital will improve the success rate of financing. However, when high-tech business incubator cannot effectively supervise start-ups, start-ups must choose speculation, and verified the necessity of startups moral hazard exists, so moral hazard of start-ups exists.

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国家自然科学基金项目（面上项目，重点项目，重大项目）；上海理工大学国家级项目