基于回收竞争的闭环供应链再制造授权策略研究

Study on strategy of remanufacturing authorization for closed-loop supply chain based on recycling competition

摘要:

在制造商受专利保护的条件下,建立了含有一个能自行回收的制造商及一个具有再制造能力的回收商的闭环供应链模型。采用Stackelberg博弈、Kuhn-tucker条件等方法研究了两种策略：不授权再制造(策略S)及授权回收商进行再制造(策略D)之后,通过算例分析,讨论了再制造所节约的成本和单位专利费用对闭环供应链参与者利润及决策的影响。结果表明：再制品供不应求的市场中,只有当回收商再制造成本低于制造商时,制造商才会授权其进行再制造。

Abstract:

This paper discussed different remanufacturing strategies of the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) for both new products and remanufacturing products with the method of Stackleberg Game and Kuhn-Tucker Conditions. This paper established a closed-loop supply chain model to examine the impacts of patent licensing in a decentralized system in which the recycler was capable of remanufacturing and both of OEM and recycler was responsible for product recovery. This paper assumed that the OEM adopts different remanufacturing strategies to protect its patent: OEM remanufacturing (strategy S) and authorized recycler remanufacturing (strategy D). Then by analyzing the examples, the influence of the cost saved by remanufacturing and patent licensing fees on the decision making and profit of OEM and recycler was probed. Finally, the result shows that the OEM would authorize recycler to remanufacture used products when the remanufacture cost of recycler is lower than OEM.