研发外包成果转化中服务商道德风险防范：合作奖励还是非合作监督？

Moral hazard prevention of service providers in achievement transformation of R D outsourcing: cooperation reward or non-cooperation monitoring?

摘要:

针对研发外包服务商参与客户技术成果转化中的道德风险防范与激励问题,首先分析了合作奖励机制与非合作监督机制(包括确定性和随机性监督)的成立条件,随后比较了合作奖励、确定性监督、随机监督三种机制对服务商道德风险的防范激励效果,研究表明成果转化成功的概率和监督成本是影响三种机制选择的关键因素,最后根据成果转化成功概率和监督成本给出了三种服务商道德风险防范激励机制的选择条件,并通过算例对结论进行了验证。

Abstract:

For the moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers in the achievement transformation of R D outsourcing, the establishment condition of cooperation reward mechanism and non-cooperation monitoring mechanism, which includes determinate monitoring and stochastic monitoring, are analyzed firstly. Then comparing respectively the effects of cooperation reward, determinate monitoring and stochastic monitoring on the moral hazard prevention and incentive problems of service providers. The result shows, the success probability of achievement transformation and the monitoring cost are the key factors influencing the choice of three mechanisms. Finally, with the success probability and monitoring cost, the applicable conditions of three mechanisms are provided. In addition, these results are verified by an example.