服务商垫资风险规避下的研发外包合同

R D outsourcing for Service Providers with Risk Averse of Restrict Capital

摘要:

在服务商是风险规避的情况下,针对服务商不愿垫资可能引发激励支付无效的问题,利用委托代理理论,构建了风险规避下服务商不愿垫资的研发外包合同,分析了服务商绝对风险规避度对研发外包合同的影响,得到了服务商不愿垫资下的研发外包合同性质与特点。研究表明,当服务商的绝对风险规避度较小时,客户企业支付给服务商的固定研发费用以及收入共享比例不变,服务商选择的最优努力水平不变,激励支付无效；当服务商的绝对风险规避度较大时,客户企业支付给服务商的固定支付先增加后减小,收入共享比例系数以及服务商选择的最优支付不断减小,服务商风险规避度越大,激励支付越无效。

Abstract:

Aiming at solving the problems of service providers unwilling to restrict capital may lead to the ineffective of incentive payment. Under the condition of risk aversion, this paper used the principal-agent theory to construct an R D outsourcing of service providers unwilling to restrict capital with risk averse and analyzed the influence of absolute risk aversion of service providers on R D outsourcing contract. Then this paper found the nature and characteristics of this R D outsourcing. Research shows that when the service provider"s absolute risk aversion is relatively small, not only are the fixed expenses paid to service providers by customer companies and revenue sharing ratio and optimal effort level that service provider selected unchanged but also is the incentive payment invalid. Otherwise the fixed expenses paid to service providers by customer companies increases first and then decreases,revenue sharing ratio and optimal effort level that service provider selected are declining. What’s more, the greater the risk aversion of service providers, the less effective incentive payments.