矿粮复合区生态补偿各方利益主体多阶段动态博弈分析

The Multistage Dynamic Games Theory Analysis on the Ecological Compensation’s Stakeholders in Mine-grain Mixed Zone

摘要:

研究目的：通过厘清各方利益主体关系,博弈探寻矿粮复合区生态补偿各方利益主体博弈的均衡条件。研究方法：文章基于不完全信息多阶段动态博弈对矿企、地方政府、农户等三主体在生态补偿中的利益倾向及三方之间关系进行分析。研究结果：(1)在第一阶段事中博弈中,地方政府与矿企的博弈结果表明提升责罚力度可降低寻租概率,地方政府与农户的博弈表明生态补偿透明化是避免寻租的有效途径。(2)由于时滞因素存在第二阶段事后博弈,地方政府与矿企博弈在监督力度增强过程伴随违法成本递增,而寻租活动发生概率随之呈负相关,地方政府与农户的博弈表明加强惩戒力度可以促使博弈趋于均衡。研究结论：(1)加强对矿企参与生态补偿活动的监督是维护生态公平与农户利益的重要环节,以从生态补偿利益寻租源头治理。(2)加强地方政府及其公职人员的纪检监察程度有利于生态补偿渠道畅通。(3)对农户进行生态污染知识、法律常识教育以提升农户监督能力,降低生态污染事件发生频率,减少寻租事件。

Abstract:

The purpose of this study is to explore the multistage games equilibrium conditions in ecological compensation in the field of mine-grain mixed zone. The study aims to find the games equilibrium. It analyzed interest bias and the relationship among government, mining enterprise and farmers by the method of multistage dynamic games with incomplete information. The results contain two parts. On one hand, enhancing the strength of punishment can reduce the probability of rent-seeking in the first stage of game when the game between government and mining enterprise. No more than, when the game between government and farmers, we set up a transparency system of ecological compensation so that avoid the rent-seeking behavior by effective way. On the other hand, there is the second stage of Game, which originates in time lag. In this stage of game(G-M), with the improving of punishment, the cost of breakingSthe law has increased while the probability of rent-seeking is negativelyScorrelatedSwith punishment. Meanwhile, in this stage of game(G-P), with the improving of punishment, the game can tend to equilibrium. The conclusions: Firstly, strengthening the supervision to mining enterprise which takes part in ecological compensation is one of important approach to ensure the ecological equity and farmers" profit. By this way, the rent-seeking can beSbrought under controlSat the beginning. Secondly, strengthening the supervision to local government and officers is benefit to ecological compensation. Thirdly, strengthening the farmers’ education can improve oversightScapability in order to induce the probability of ecological pollution and rent-seeking. The educational content consists of ecological pollution knowledge and legal knowledge.