专利刺激政策的运行机制及其对专利质量的影响——基于1995-2015年省级面板数据的实证分析

Operational mechanism of the patent stimulus policy and its impact on the quality of patents- Empirical analysis based on 1995--2015 provincial panel data

摘要:

本文基于对中央到地方的专利刺激政策文件的规范研究,定性分析了专利刺激政策的运行机制,并根据1995年至2015年31个省级样板数据,将其对专利质量的影响作了定量的实证分析。研究表明,中央到地方的专利刺激政策使得专利授权制度突破了经典的“公开换取垄断”的理论框架,转向政府对专利的“购买”模式。这种模式推动了专利数量的激增,但与专利质量呈现了负的相关性。而专利质量与地区经济水平呈现了正的相关性。

Abstract:

Based on the research of the central and local patent policy documents, we made a qualitative analysis of the patent stimulus operating mechanism. And based on the 1995 to 2015 of the 31 provincial-level data, we made a quantitative analysis on the quality of patents. Research shows that patent stimulus policy of the central to local made such patents system to break the classic theoretical framework ‘public exchange monopoly’, turning to the mode of government ‘buying’ the patents. This model driven surge in the number of patents, but the quality of patents presented a negative correlation. The quality of patents and regional economic level presents a positive correlation.